U.S. 43, 45 O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SCALIA, J., joined, and in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined in part, post, p. 491 U. S. 289. But in the end we accept the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of its October 14 order and will not assume that its action in this case is not in accord with its regular practice. ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Mexico by Hal Stratton, Attorney General, Randall W. Childress, Deputy Attorney General, Charles R. Peifer, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Paul Farley, Assistant Attorney General; for Jackson County, Missouri, by John B. Williams and Russell D. Jacobson; for the National Governors' Association et al. Whatever the merits of this argument when applied to the District Court's own order increasing taxes, a point we have not reached, see supra, at 53, a court order directing a local government body to levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal court. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer. Respondents did not cross-petition to challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals' judgment, so the surcharge is not before us. However, concluding that federal/state comity principles required the District Court to use minimally obtrusive methods to remedy constitutional violations, it required that, in the future, the lower court should not set the property tax rate itself, but should authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to state tax collection authorities and should enjoin the operation of state tax laws hindering KCMSD from adequately funding the remedy. This final iteration of the Missouri v. Jenkins cases (this case is deemedMissouri v. Jenkins III) marks the end of the Courts involvement in the 18-year-long litigation. The State appealed, challenging the scope of the desegregation remedy, the allocation of the cost between the State and KCMSD, and the tax increase. He argued that as the State and KCMSD were jointly and severally liable for the cost of the desegregation remedy, the District Court should have allowed any amount that KCMSD was unable to pay to fall on the State rather than require the tax increase. Footnote 16 No. U.S. 33, 42] 5 In this 18-year-old school desegregation litigation, see, e. g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, Missouri challenges the District Court's orders . Supp., at 28, 31-33. Turning to the property tax increase, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that a federal court lacks the judicial power to order a tax increase. U.S. 33, 58] Rather, that term must refer to a reasonable fee for an attorney's work product, and thus must take into account the work not only of attorneys, but also the work of paralegals and the like. They insist that the Eighth Circuit cannot, post hoc, amend its order to make it appear that it took an action which it never took. 215 As a result, the District Court began to order remedial measures. This argument was rejected as early as Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, supra. We presume that the Eighth Circuit withheld the mandate Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III) United States Supreme Court 515 U.S. 70 (1995) Facts The Kansas City, Missouri, School District (the district) (plaintiff) and a group of students (plaintiff) sued Missouri (defendant) in 1977 for maintaining a segregated school system in violation of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). for Cert. [495 The Court of Appeals affirmed most of the initial order, but ordered the lower court to divide the remedy's cost equally between the entities. See Langnes v. Green, And the important effects of the taxation order discussed here raise additional federalism concerns that counsel against the Court's analysis. Date: July 25, 2021 To: Professor Jason DeVaux From: Victoria Y. Rosebeary Case: Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) Facts: In an action under 42 U.S.C. The court rejected various proposals by the State to make "capital improvements necessary to eliminate health and safety hazards and to provide a good learning environment," because these proposals failed to "consider the criteria of suburban comparability." 2 But there was an alternative, the very one outlined by the Court of Appeals: it could have authorized or required KCMSD to levy property taxes at a rate adequate to fund the desegregation remedy and could have enjoined the operation of state laws that would have prevented KCMSD from exercising this power. ." The Court's statements, in my view, cannot be seen as necessary for its judgment, or as precedent for the future, and I cannot join Parts III and IV of the Court's opinion. 2641, as amended, 42 U.S.C. . 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. Ante, at 57. In 1985, US District Court Judge Russell Clark ordered the legal remedy of educational improvement programs, school facility repairs, and magnet schools, which were thought to be the best way to attract white suburban students back into city schools. 1651, 1666, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990), another case involving school desegregation, the Court held, "Even though a particular remedy may not be required in every case to vindicate constitutional guarantees, where (as here) it has been found that a particular remedy is required, the State cannot hinder the process by preventing a local government . The difference between the two approaches is far more than a matter of form. The Court held the subsequent limitation itself unconstitutional, a violation of the Contracts Clause. 377 Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, This page was last edited on 2 January 2022, at 04:55. Since then, the total cost of capital improvements ordered has soared to over $540 million. App. Cf. 14. In an action under 42 U.S.C. Therefore, that information is unavailable for most Encyclopedia.com content. 344 for Cert. The mandate of the Court of Appeals issued on October 14. [ remand for further modifications as provided in this opinion"). Footnote 2 v. Rodriguez. 2101(c) --which requires that a civil certiorari petition be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment below, and that any application for an extension of time be filed within the original 90-day period -- since, while the filing of a "petition for rehearing" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "suggestion for rehearing in banc" under Rule 35 does not. [495 In assuming for itself the fundamental and delicate power of taxation the District Court not only intruded on local authority but circumvented it altogether. The Court of Appeals held that the salary increase was to avoid white flight, and that the quality education programs have yet to eliminate the vestiges of segregation. If, however, judicial discretion is to provide the sole limit on judicial remedies, that discretion must counsel restraint. officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD," ante, at 56, n. 20, cause the KCMSD to exercise power under state law. App. (1880); id., at 515 (Field, J., concurring in judgment) ("[W]hen the law is gone, and the office of the collector abolished, there is nothing upon which the courts can act"); cf. (1990), is missing here. A district court may not create an intra-district segregation remedial plan with the purpose of attracting nonminority students into the district. For this reason, I reject the artificial suggestion that the District Court may, by "prevent[ing] . 705 (1867) (mandamus to state officials to collect a tax authorized by state law The historical record of voluntary compliance with the decree of Brown v. Board of Education is not a proud chapter in our constitutional history, and the judges of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals have been courageous and skillful in implementing its mandate. (1955), observed, local authorities have the "primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving" the problems of desegregation. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II) United States Supreme Court 495 U.S. 33 (1990) Facts The Kansas City, Missouri, School District (the district) (plaintiff) and a group of students (plaintiffs) sued Missouri (defendant) in 1977 for maintaining a segregated school system in violation of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 535 (1867), for the proposition that a federal court may set aside state taxation limits that interfere with the remedy sought by the district court. at 411. The court reasoned that the State should pay for most of the desegregation cost under the principle that "the person 102 Id., at 44. Id., at 112a. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities nor . Milliken v. Bradley, Our Rule 13.4 now expressly incorporates this practice. U.S. 170 There are strong arguments against the validity of such a plan. nor the record support this view. Missouri v. Jenkins provides a good starting point for examin-ing the role of the judiciary in sculpting, implementing, and moni-toring a remedial plan for desegregation. The function of hiring and supervising a staff for what is essentially a political function has other complications. The panel is required to consider the contentions in the petition for rehearing, if only to reject them. The Court fails to provide any explanation why this case presents the need to endorse by dictum so drastic a step. The District Court declined to require the State to pay for KCMSD's obligations because it believed that the Court of Appeals had ordered it to allocate the costs between the two governmental entities. On January 10, 1989, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals issued an amended order, recalling the October 14 mandate and entering nunc pro tunc, effective October 14, an order denying the three "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc." 16 535, and fails to take account of local governments' obligations, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. 9th Circuit. There is no allegation here, nor could there be, that the neutral tax limitations imposed by the people of Missouri are unconstitutional. 23Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. We said that such a remedy "could be construed as the direct imposition of a state tax, a remedy beyond the power of a federal court." In this case, where the practice in the relevant market is to bill the work of paralegals separately, the District Court's decision to award separate compensation for paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates at prevailing market rates was fully in accord with 1988. Annual Subscription ($175 / Year). The focus of their concern is Missouri v. Jenkins,' a 1990 United States Supreme Court decision. Pp. in order to fund a state bond obligation); Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. No. But we did not there state that a district court could never set aside state laws preventing local governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional obligations just because those funds could also be obtained from the States.

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